as also must be the likely natural history of the untreated disease process. Secondly, there must be some element of probabilistic judgement, as the nature of side-effects and indeed of outcome require at least an elementaryunderstandingof probability. Irwin et a! (1985) have written about the difficulties of acutely psychotic patients in understanding informed consent, and examined the abilities of both voluntary and involuntary patients to understand information about anti-psychotic medication.
Although most patients stated that they had understood informed consent material, objective ratings did not support this. Impaired understanding was significantly associated with thought disturbance, but surprisinglydid not affectacceptance,nor refusal of medication. Legal status was not a significant factor either. However, this was very much a study only of acutely admitted patients, and there is little written on the equivalent in chronic patients.
Rational assessmentfor the need for treatment
In a recent article, Hatcher (1995) looked at the process of decision analysis in psychiatry. His discussion emphasises that treatment choice is a decision the patient makes on the advice of a doctor, and emphasises the similarity between a medical problem, and gambling on probabilities. Decision analysis is seen as explicit, quantitative, and prescriptive. Numerical values can be put on key uncertainties, and on the personal value of possible outcomes.
A worked example is given concerning
prophylactic maintenance anti-psychotics following remission from a first episode of schizophrenia. The risk of recurrence can be estimated from the literature, but the patient's decision will be influenced by how much they value the lower likelihood of recurrence versus the risk of tardive dyskinesia.
Perhaps surprisingly,the best decisionis very much influenced in the theoretical model by the risk of recurrence without medication, and less so by the value placed on the risk of recurrencewithout tardive dyskinesia. Hatcher concedesthat decisionanalysis is more likelyto be of value in teaching, audit, and research, than in clinical decision taking.
The reader who has got this far, will appreciate that the intellectual processing necessary for the careful analysis of treatment and outcome variables in making the decision to have treatment for a disabling condition such as chronic schizophrenia, which also carries a high death-rate of some 10% or 15% as a lifetime risk, is an extremely difficult process.
The â€˜¿ Sidaway' case Scarman (1985) , and his fellow Law Lords in the Upper House agreed basically with this sort of analysis, giving legal credence to the processes involved. Mrs Sidawaysuffered paralysis following a neurosurgical operation to reduce pressure on nerve-roots in her neck. She argued that she would not have given consent if she had been informed of this very remote, though obviously very serious, complication. The ruling was such that a serious outcome was so remote, that it need not have been raised in the original process of gaining informed consent.
Once again, the patient giving informed consent clearly needs some estimate of probabilities in assessing whether or not the side-effects of treatment 565 are serious, and whether or not they are better than being left with the untreated condition. This case also illustratesthe importance of changingone's mind as more information is given.
Cognitive abnormalities in chronic schizophrenia Crow & Johnstone (1982) found many cognitive abnormalities in such patients. Their major finding was age disorientation. Some 25Â°lo of their sample were five years or more out in their estimation of their own chronological age. The authors concluded that â€˜¿ Time stands still', particularly as many such patients reported their age on admission, that is to say about the age of onset, and this sort of fmding is particularly reminiscent of patients with severe amnesic syndromes following various sorts of organic brain injury.
As well as age disorientation, there was a severe and generalised impairment of memory and intelligence, including orientation, general knowledge, association learning, remote learning, vocabulary, use of language, visuo-spatial matrix tests, digit symbol substitution tests, and mental tests scores. Their conclusion was that the psycho pathological difference between functional and organic psychoses is less maintained in the case of schizophrenia than is sometimes thought to be the case.
Common sense dictates that a patient who does not know their own age would have major difficulties with complex judgements, such as the giving of informed consent.
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
While no specific test is characteristic of chronic schizophrenia(otherwisewewould have a diagnostic test), considerable interest of recent years has been taken in this particular test, known to be affected specifically by lesions in the dorso-lateral aspect of the prefrontal cortex. This test is exceedingly tedious to perform and rate, but shortened and simplified versions have become available on micro-computer. Basically, cards with symbols differing in colour, shape, and number are presented sequentially to the patient. The problem that this test identifies, is in noting the switch between concepts outlined above. High perseverative error scores are suggestive of conceptual inflexibility, of particular relevance to the â€˜¿ Sidaway Case', where the plaintiff claimed that she would have altered her mind if only she had been given extra information.
Not all patients do have problems with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and age, duration of illness and the extent of hospitalisation are factors known to influence results.
It could be argued that these changes occurred secondarily to long-term institutional care. Against this is a recent study of patients with much shorter illnesses. Goldberg et a! (1993) , in a study of monozygotic twins discordant for schizophrenia, found marked cognitive impairments in the schizophrenictwin. They found that the severityof the declarative learning and memory deficits was strongly associated with the global level of functioning. These were patients with a mean length of illness of only 10.3 years.
Their inability to acquire new information rapidly, access old information propitiously, and divert attention between important environmental stimuli and integrated information processing might make for difficulty â€˜¿ in even the most routine mental operation of everyday life'. The authors wondered if anticholinergic medication, so commonly prescribed in schizophrenia, might make memory worse, but their basic finding added further weight to the emergent recognition that cognitive impairment is the central aspect of the disease process in schizophrenia and not just an epi-phenomenon of psychopathology, that is to say attention being diverted by hallucinations, thought-blocking and so on. Recent work by Hagger eta! (1993) 
Probabilistic judgements in patients with chronic schizophrenia
Huq et a! (1988) compared deluded subjects with a non-deluded psychiatric control group consisting mostly of anxious patients, as well as a normal control group, on a probabilistic inference task. This was really a ridiculously simple task, involving guessing the proportion of different coloured beads in jam-jars. Beads were mixed in the ratio of 85:15, and the subject was blind as to which colour was in the majority. The experimenter picked out beads one at a time and presentedthem to the subject, who was asked to report when they had reached complete certainty as to which colour was in the majority. Deluded subjects were found to request less information before reaching a decision, and to express higher certainty levels than either control group.
They also exhibited over-confidence on estimates of the probability of a future event. These snap judgements and an over-optimisticview of the future without treatment, are those which are expressed frequentlyin front of mental health reviewtribunals.
It should be remembered that normal subjects may well show poor probabilistic judgement. One classic example is the Minimax principle, with people betting on a national lottery because the first prize isso big. The informed statistician would make his decision on the statistical odds, not on the size of the prize. However, normal subjects have no difficulty with Huq's test, which is not one of fine discrimination but of mixtures of 85:15 v. 15:85. This judgement could be seen as a model of the discrimination between major and minor side-effects of a course of treatment.
This study was replicated and extended by Garety
et a! (1991). They found that after certainty was
reached, deluded subjects were much more likely to make a dramatic change in probability estimate following an item of discordant confirmatory information. They felt that this was consistent with those models of schizophrenia which emphasise the greater influence of immediate environmental stimuli compared with the effects of prior learning.
This is of particular interest to the judgement of the â€˜¿ Sidaway Case', as MrsSidawayclearlyemphasised that she would have changed her mind with regard to consent to operation if only she had been given extra information.
The intellectual and educational problem
In their rush to achieve inter-rater reliability, many psychiatrists are now trained in diagnostic systems based ultimately upon Schneider's first rank symptoms. These spectacular delusions and hallucinations do indeed go into remission for many patients with chronic schizophrenia, but the underlying defects of logical thinking which may affect judgement and hence the consent to treatment, do not necessarily respond so well to treatment, nor indeed to the passage of time. Although now unfashionable, Bleuler's four â€˜¿ A's include asyndetic (illogical) thinking, which is perhaps the most characteristic part of the autism of chronic schizophrenia.
Indeed, there are many comparisons between chronic schizophrenia and frontal lobe impairment that make one think of chronic schizophrenia as a long-term handicapping condition in which the cognitive impairment is truly central.
Conclusion
Some significant proportion of patients with chronic schizophrenia suffer from defects of cognitive function so grave as to throw into doubt their ability to give informed consent to treatment, in particular the prescription of neuroleptics to reduce the risk of relapse.
The literature is unclear on what proportion are thus affected. However, there are now available a variety of tests, particularly neuropsychological ones, that are rather simplistic models of the processes involved in giving informed consent. The application of such tests may well help the clinician in deciding whether or not such patients are fit to give informed consent, and it is hoped that better experimental models will become available in the future.
Implications formentalhealthlaw
The House of Commons Health Committee rejected in 1993 the concept of a Community Supervision Order on seven grounds, one of which was that patients suffering from mental disorder were normal between episodes and hence should be allowed to exert their normal judgement as to whether or not they choose to continue with preventative treatments.
From much of the argument above, it is apparent that some patients with chronic schizophrenia have major cognitive impairment, such as to interferewith their judgement, and that this impairment seems relatively enduring.
